Boeing 737 MAX Software Glitch|22-Month No-Risk Verdict vs. FAA Review Board?

A glitch Boeing calls handled

Boeing has warned airlines that a 737 MAX software glitch can cut automated landing guidance after an aborted landing. Boeing says pilots can already handle it safely, but the FAA is convening a review board to decide that for itself. Boeing's own description is modest. The company said it shared information with operators that "reinforced existing pilot procedures for safely handling such cases."

It added that its engineers are working on a software update to permanently address the issue. The Federal Aviation Administration answered with a very different kind of sentence. It said it "will convene a Corrective Action Review Board and will take immediate action if it identifies a safety concern." Two dates sit underneath those statements.

Simple Flying and other outlets report that Boeing first identified the glitch in November 2024. They report that Boeing did not tell operators then, because the glitch was not deemed a safety issue. Airlines were told in late August 2026, according to a company document reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. The Journal's report came on September 26, 2026.

From first identification to that report is about twenty-two months. The second date is the one Boeing had been waiting for. The company was thought to be days away from certifying the 737 MAX 10, the final model in its best-selling jet family. Reports say that if the review board finds a flight-safety issue, MAX 10 certification could be delayed.

The rollout of the recently approved MAX 7 could also get more complicated.

How narrow is the flaw

Some early coverage said the glitch could force pilots to land manually instead of using autopilot. The engineering detail is narrower than that. The problem needs a specific chain of events. The jet is flying a precision approach with the autopilot engaged. The crew aborts the landing, a maneuver called a go-around. Then the pilots change the route programmed into the flight management computer.

At that point, the vertical navigation system, known as VNAV, can disconnect. VNAV is the function that automatically holds planned altitudes at points along the flight path. The autopilot itself can keep working, but with a less sophisticated form of automated pitch control. And only two versions of the flight computer's software are involved: versions 14 and 14.1. So the flaw is narrow. Its timing is not.

CBS News reports that the scenario would typically unfold at low altitude near an airport, where pilots already carry a high workload. One airline source put it bluntly to CBS: "How busy do you want your crew to be?" The same source asked, "Are you introducing distractions at the worst possible moment?" Boeing's answer is that pilots are trained to land without this automated system.

The company says it is "working directly with airlines to formalize a procedure that will allow pilots to reenable automated vertical navigation." Look at what neither side disputes. Boeing itself says pilots must take additional steps on the next approach. The disagreement is whether that extra work, at that moment, is a safety concern. That is the question in front of the FAA's board.

Unaffected customers, refusing anyway

The biggest U.S. airlines say they are not exposed. Alaska, American, Southwest and United all say their MAX jets now in service do not run the affected software versions. Yet two of them acted anyway. Southwest and United have told Boeing they will not accept new aircraft equipped with the software. They are opting for an earlier version instead. That refusal shows where the problem actually sits.

The glitch is tied to a cockpit software update, and the jets these carriers are waiting for would carry it. For these customers, the question is not the planes already in their fleets. It is what comes off Boeing's production line next. A flight-deck quirk has become a question about Boeing's deliveries.

Twenty-two months

Boeing's public statement opens with the words "Last month, we informed all 737 operators." The reported timeline starts much earlier, and with someone else. MyNorthwest, citing The Wall Street Journal, reports that Boeing learned of the glitch from an airline in November 2024. Boeing then determined it did not rise to the level of requiring a safety review. In late August 2026, Boeing notified 737 MAX operators.

According to the Journal, it told them at the time that the glitch did not pose a safety risk. The same reporting says Boeing began a safety review only in September 2026. Boeing tells one part of this differently. The company told KIRO 7 that it informed the FAA of the software issue when it was discovered during a safety review. The coverage does not explain how that account fits the reported timeline.

What it does establish is who made the call for most of those twenty-two months. It was Boeing's own judgment that the glitch was not a safety issue. The FAA's review board is now being asked to make that same call.

What the board decides

The review came just as Boeing appeared to be approaching MAX 10 certification. At the same time, it was preparing to begin deliveries of the recently certified MAX 7. The MAX 10 is not a side project. In July 2026, the lessor SMBC Aviation Capital ordered 100 MAX jets. Sixty of them were MAX 10s. Boeing says the MAX 10 seats up to 230 passengers.

Simple Flying calls it the first jet that gives Boeing a true competitor to Airbus's best-selling A321neo. The board's reach also extends to the cure. The FAA said it will review Boeing's proposed fix. The permanent software update Boeing's engineers are writing will go before the same regulator that is weighing the MAX 10. This aircraft's history hangs over all of it. Two 737 MAX crashes killed 346 people.

They came in October 2018 and March 2019. A key factor was an automated flight-control system meant to assist pilots, which could intervene too strongly under certain conditions. No report says the new glitch repeats that failure. But once again, the question is how far pilots can rely on this jet's automation.

The fork

One basic fact is still missing: scale. More than 2,000 737 MAX jets have been delivered, and it remains unclear how many are affected. The FAA, Boeing and airlines are still assessing how widely the software is used, and whether it presents a broader safety risk. That leaves two branches.

If the board finds no safety concern, Boeing's path is the one it described: existing procedures now, a formal way to restore VNAV, and a software update later. If the board does identify a safety concern, the FAA has said it will take immediate action. That is the branch that reaches the MAX 10 timetable. Go back to where this started.

Boeing calls this a case pilots can already handle, and for about twenty-two months its own judgment kept it off the safety agenda. That judgment now belongs to the FAA's board. The thing to watch is that board's finding on whether the glitch is a flight-safety concern. If it finds none, Boeing keeps its path toward the MAX 10, and the refusal by Southwest and United becomes a choice of software version.

If it finds a concern, Boeing's MAX 10 and MAX 7 plans could slip, and customers waiting for those jets could wait longer.

Informational only, not investment advice. Figures and quotes come from the linked reports.